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Abstract 
According to nation branding, consultants problems of underdevelopment and global inequality are, 
to a significant extent, a product of the negative images peddled by charities and the broader 
development industry. While such images secure donations, it is argued, they deter more sustainable 
investments. In contrast, consultants argue that concerted nation-branding strategies offer much 
better solutions to problems of underdevelopment. This article subjects such claims to critical 
examination and argues that while the diagnosis of the problem may have some merit, the solution 
offered is more problematic. This is because nation-branding practices are inherently status quo 
oriented and reflective of a neoliberal understanding of the nature of (under)development. 
Moreover, nation branding also entails a troubling commodification of identity and culture as well 
as unsettling implications in respect of extant understandings of ‘good governance’. Finally, the 
paper suggests that the dichotomy drawn between aid and nation branding cannot be upheld; rather, 
it is a device used to legitimise a market for the services of nation-branding consultants. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the idea and practice of nation branding have gained increased currency with 
multiple countries employing branding consultants (be they major marketing companies like 
Interbrand and Saatchi and Saatchi or independent policy advisors1), establishing branding 
commissions and producing branding strategies, all designed to enhance the profile and image of 
their respective nation. Aping the business world, where ‘brand value’ is sometimes estimated to 
account for as much as 40–60 percent of the value of individual companies (Jansen 2008: 125), 
nations are increasingly being enticed by the hope that nation branding might have a similar effect 
on national fortunes. Just as consumers might want to purchase certain branded products because of 
the reputation and image that the brand conveys, it is hoped that a strong national brand might 
similarly encourage them to buy products because of their country of origin, or it might encourage 
investors to unload capital in their country, or entice skilled professionals to seek employment there, 
or it might enhance the international status and influence of the country in question. In short, it is 
hoped that branding might provide a competitive edge in the globalised economy by helping 
branded nations – ‘cool Britannia’, ‘incredible India’, ‘Malaysia truly Asia’ – stand out from the 
crowd. Helpfully, the industry has also developed a range of indexes – the best known being the 
Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, the FutureBrand Country Index and the East West Global 
Index 200 – all designed to measure the relative performance of different national brands and 
provide a guide as to whether a nation’s brand value is rising or falling and providing clear 
incentives for governments to take action. 
These developments have also begun to attract academic interest across various disciplines 
including business and marketing studies, economics, sociology, anthropology, communication 
studies and, to a more limited extent, politics and international relations. As Kaneva (2011) notes, in 
general, this literature can be divided into three categories: ‘technical-economic approaches’, 
written from the perspective of branding practitioners and marketing scholars seeking to better 
understand how to use branding to a nation’s competitive advantage (e.g. Moilanen and Rainisto 
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2009); ‘political approaches’, which typically focus on nation branding’s relationship to public 
diplomacy and in which nation branding is often tied to reputation and viewed as a potential form of 
soft power (e.g. van Ham 2002, 2008);2 and ‘cultural approaches’, concerned particularly with the 
implications of nation branding for the politics of identity and with how nation branding might 
entail implications for the governance and disciplining of societies (e.g. Aronczyk 2008). 
While drawing on all these bodies of literature, the article focuses in particular on recent 
industry proclamations concerning the relationship between nation branding and 
(under)development. Two claims stand out. The first is that problems of underdevelopment, 
especially in Africa, are in part caused by the negative branding of the developing world by the 
developed world whereby the developing world is depicted as a hopeless basket case, fit for charity 
but not for investment. The second is that, to resolve this problem, the developing world needs to 
take control of its own image through concerted efforts of nation and region branding. 
Academic analyses of these claims have been limited to date; however, arguably, they require 
critical analysis. In part, this is because such analyses function to neutralise negative perceptions of 
nation branding by making nation branding appear an instrument of social and global justice. 
However, the article argues that such claims are also necessarily premised on very particular and 
status quo oriented notions of what constitutes development in the first place. Indeed, the article 
argues that narratives of nation branding function to spread and naturalise the Washington 
Consensus view that poverty reduction will only occur through embedding poor countries into 
global markets, fostering consumer cultures and strengthening their economic competitiveness 
(Cammack 2009). In this process, and drawing on Foucauldian insights, it is argued that nation 
branding also contributes to the subordination of states to market logics, while simultaneously 
shifting responsibility for development onto the poor states themselves by emphasising their need to 
take ownership of their national brands. Beyond this, however, nation-branding practices can also 
be viewed as a neo-colonial governmental technology, which empowers (largely Western) experts 
in establishing what constitutes relevant knowledge in a globalising world, which subordinates 
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questions of national identity to market preferences, and which extends governance responsibilities 
beyond the state through the expectation that civil society will become actively engaged in branding 
processes (Sending and Neumann 2006; Larner 2002; Rose 1993). 
The article is divided into five sections. In the first section, the case for nation branding is 
articulated, and where it is argued that in a globalised world nation branding can secure various 
dividends, from promoting economic competitiveness and growth to enhancing national solidarity 
and self-esteem. It is noted that, under the guise of branding discourse, the problem of development 
in a globalised world ultimately becomes one of recognition, visibility and self-esteem. In the 
second section, the article provides an overview of the extent to which the developing world has 
come to accept the claim that nation branding might well provide some of the solutions to problems 
of underdevelopment. This can be evidenced in the development of various nation-branding 
commissions and strategies. In the third section, the article engages critically with the arguments 
made in favour of nation branding as a solution to problems of underdevelopment. As indicated, the 
core argument here is that branding rests on a number of problematic assumptions about the nature 
and causes of economic underdevelopment, as well as about the nature of what constitutes 
development in the first place. In the fourth section, the article shifts focus to critically examine the 
role of development aid in the construction of national brands of both the states with established 
brands of being developed and those states seeking recognition for a developed world status. In this 
process, some of the inherent contradictions evident in viewing nation branding as a solution to 
problems of underdevelopment become crystallised. Finally, the article reflects on the constitutive 
role of consultants in the nation-branding process and urges caution when assessing the claims they 
make. This is so not least because many of the claims made about the impact of branding lack solid 
evidence and are, at best, circumstantial or result from correlative effects. At worst, branding 
consultants can be accused of hype and of being concerned primarily with carving out a new market 
for their services. 
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The imperatives of globalisation 
Be they consultants, academics or policymakers, those making the case for nation branding embed 
their arguments in the claim that economic globalisation has fundamentally transformed the nature 
of world politics and the state system, changing the rules of the game. To this extent, the discourse 
on nation branding reflects and builds upon claims made in International Political Economy about 
the transmogrification of the Westphalian state into the ‘competition state’ over the last several 
decades, a transformation which has increasingly seen states promoting national economic 
champions and, more recently, competing with each other to be the most attractive destination for 
footloose global capital and business (Cerny 1990; Fougner 2006). Thus, instead of states making 
their mark and earning prestige on the battlefield, now national prestige is to be earned in the global 
marketplace (Jansen 2008: 125). Indeed, van Ham (2002: 252) speaks of the emergence of a 
‘postmodern world of images and influence’ that is set to replace and ‘emasculate power oriented 
geopolitics’. In this world, instead of competing over territory and material power resources, the 
branding consultant Simon Anholt (2007: 72) suggests countries, cities and regions will need to 
focus on competing with each other for their ‘share of the world’s consumers, tourists, investors, 
students, entrepreneurs, international sporting and cultural events; and for the attention and respect 
of the international media, of other governments, and the people of other countries’. This indicates a 
seismic change, in which statesmen are no longer tasked with deploying battalions and are instead 
reconstituted as national ‘brand managers’ (Anholt 2010: 14) whose primary task is to ‘manage, and 
leverage their [national] brand equity’ (van Ham 2002: 254). In a branding world, what counts is, 
arguably, standing apart from the crowd and identifying niche areas of expertise or a reputation for 
doing particular things well. 
Branding is, therefore, seen to entail a range of potential dividends. Economically, it is argued 
that states and regions with strong brands will be able to attract foreign investment and foreign 
specialists to locate in the country, while strong brands eliciting a reputation for reliability, 
environmentalism, cutting-edge technology, chic etc. may also enhance the country-of-origin effect 
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and, thereby, encourage global consumers to purchase products precisely on the basis of their 
location of national origin (Anholt 2002: 232–33; van Ham 2008: 128–29). Politically, a strong 
brand may also enhance a state’s soft power and ability to influence international political issues. 
Various nations have therefore placed ‘peace’ (e.g. Finland, South Africa), or ‘progress and 
democracy’ (e.g. Sweden) at the heart of their national branding campaigns in the hope this might 
help carve out an international identity and provide them with the basis for a voice on the 
international stage on particular issues. Finally, however, brands are also internally oriented, with 
nation-branding campaigns also seen as providing the opportunity to enhance solidarity and the 
collective sense of national self-esteem (Browning forthcoming; van Ham 2002: 253). Indeed, in 
contrast to the Marxist-inspired criticisms of the alienating effects of capitalism, advocates argue 
that brands (whether national or product brands) can provide a renewed sense of belonging that 
responds to both individual and social needs, thereby helping citizens feel good about themselves 
(York 2011; Jansen 2008: 126; van Ham 2005: 123; Freire 2005). 
Put succinctly, nation-branding advocates argue that, with globalisation having turned the 
world into a single global market place, everyone is competing with everyone else for market share. 
In this world, being visible, possessing a national reputation for having something distinctive to 
offer and having a brand becomes fundamental in being able to claim a slice of the global economic 
and political market. Therefore, branding is about claiming agency and making globalisation work 
for you. From this perspective, failing to play the branding game becomes depicted as irresponsible, 
with Anholt (2009a: 216) arguing that, in the globalised world, the fundamental responsibility of 
governments is to pass down the national image and reputation intact and preferably enhanced for 
future generations (also Freire 2005). As van Ham (2008: 131) puts it, why would anyone invest in 
or visit an unknown country, let alone pay any attention to its political or strategic demands. In 
short, ‘if we have no clue what the country is all about […] why should we care’? 
Even more problematic, however, is the concern that nations failing to adopt a branding 
strategy actively may well find their image sabotaged by others. This is where, it is argued, the 
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relationship between branding and development becomes central. As various advocates note, while 
Germany and Japan might be known for technology, and Italy for fashion and food, Africa 
overwhelmingly conjures up images of ‘poverty, corruption, war, famine and disease’ (Anholt 
2007: 72; Versi 2009). Irrespective of the fact that the reality may be often quite different, Africa 
suffers from what Anholt (2007: 75) terms a negative ‘continent brand effect’, in which more 
progressive parts of the continent become tarred with the same brush. The result is that negative 
perceptions come to frame the ‘reality’ for the whole of Africa. 
Nation-branding advocates locate responsibility for this with the misguided activities of 
otherwise well-meaning do-gooders. Thus, Melissa Davis of the London-based agency True 
Branding comments that ‘Africa’s dominant image has been created by the charity brands: the 1985 
Live Aid to provide food for Ethiopia. 2005s Live 8. “Make Poverty History”, G8 politics. Bono, 
Sir Bob, celebrity adoptions and Vanity Fair covers’ (quoted in Versi 2009; Anholt 2007: 76). Such 
images ‘create a perception of Africa as a continent that is beyond hope: too much poverty, too 
much death and an overwhelming sense of too many problems with too few solutions’ (Davis 
quoted in Versi 2009). There is, of course, a certain amount of truth in this. The development of aid 
into a business in its own right is well documented, with aid agencies frequently seeking out ever 
more shocking and stereotyped images in order to encourage viewers to fund the next relief effort 
(see Polman 2010). Indeed, such ‘poverty porn’ has spread to such an extent that, within the aid 
community, its effectiveness has been questioned because it is seen to produce ‘compassion fatigue’ 
in donors, but it is also seen as reinforcing paternalistic attitudes towards helpless others on the part 
of the West (Cameron and Haanstra 2008: 1477–79).3 However, the key contention of nation-
branding advocates is that such practices not only result in skewed images but are also central in 
keeping the developing world (and Africa especially) locked in poverty, the assumption being that 
the giving of money for aid is at odds with the giving of money for investment. Thus, Anholt (2007: 
76) goes as far as to argue that ‘branding for charity and branding for economic development are 
fundamentally incompatible’ (also da Silva 2010). 
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Polarising aid and investment in this way has a couple of constitutive effects. First, it 
indicates that the key problem of African underdevelopment is one of images and brands. Aid, it is 
claimed, results in negative images which, in turn, result in the developed world responding in the 
wrong ways. As Ruurd Brouwer, the Africa Director of the Dutch development bank FMO, 
suggests, images of starving African children and the like, favoured by aid agencies, need to be 
replaced with ‘pictures of successful African bankers driving Mercedes cars’ (quoted in Versi 
2009). Second, it implies that the solution to underdevelopment lies with the business rather than 
with the development community and, moreover, that the development community, irrespective of 
their intentions, actually exerts a pernicious effect on the life chances of those they claim to be 
helping. Such a diagnosis therefore indicates that the solution to problems of African 
underdevelopment should lie in a concerted effort of national re-branding, in which African nations 
wrest control of their national brands away from the developed world and take responsibility for 
creating them themselves. As such, nation branding is depicted by its advocates as having 
potentially emancipatory effects by helping developing nations gain control over their destinies. 
Moreover, by promoting economic growth, it is argued, nation branding will also promote global 
justice by helping close the gap between the world’s rich and poor countries (Anholt 2005). Thus, 
contra Naomi Klein (2000), who views branding as a source of injustice and as something to be 
fought against, nation-branders suggest that the poor adopt this tool for their own purposes of 
attracting capital and competing in the global competition (Weidner 2011). Interestingly, this view 
has also been partially accepted by international development and trade organisations like the 
World Bank, WTO and UN agencies like the World Intellectual Property Organisation, which have 
each begun to encourage developing countries to brand themselves and their products in the name 
of economic growth (Aronczyk 2008: 45; Gumbel 2005; Jansen 2008: 121). 
 
Message received: Brands in action 
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Importantly, this message has also been received in the developing world. This can be seen in two 
key respects. First, it is evidenced by the proliferation of branding commissions across a range of 
countries within the developing world, such as Colombia, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa and 
Palestine, the goal being to overcome pessimism by asserting more positive claims about these 
countries and thereby claiming some level of control over the politics of identity creation (Youde 
2009: 127; Wanjiru 2005: 84). Moreover, attentive to Anholt’s ‘continent brand effect’, in 2010 the 
Brand Africa initiative was established in order to enhance the continent’s overall reputation, image 
and competitiveness (see www.brandafrica.net). Second, it is evidenced in the extent to which the 
discourse of branding consultants (usually from the developed world) is often parroted uncritically 
within the developing world. Again, this can be seen in terms of the perceived causes and solutions 
to problems of underdevelopment, but also in terms of what branding is seen to entail. 
Typically, the causes are identified in terms of negative images perpetuated by the Western 
media. To quote Rwandan President Paul Kagame, ‘[o]ne of the reasons Africa is unable to attract 
enough foreign direct investment, which we need for our development, is the constant negative 
reporting’ (quoted in Versi 2012: 80). Similarly, Thebe Ikalafeng, founder and chairman of the 
Brand Africa initiative, laments the one-dimensional stories told of Africa that depict it as a land of 
calamities, abject failures and poverty (Versi 2012: 94). This ‘bad brand’, it is argued, ‘is actually 
encouraging a reduction in foreign direct investment’ (Dambisa Moyo quoted in Brand Africa 2010: 
10). However, an element of self-criticism is also apparent in this discussion. Reflecting orientalist 
and post-colonial critiques highlighting how colonial ideas were often normalised and domesticated 
by colonised peoples, with this resulting in a lack of confidence in their own views (Thiong’o 1998; 
Said 1978), Ikalafeng notes that ‘[w]e have allowed others to monopolise our story to such an 
extent that we have come to see ourselves in those images. We have come to believe that indeed we 
are powerless and backward as we are portrayed’ (quoted in Versi 2012: 99). Put more harshly, the 
economist Dambisa Moyo chastises African leaders for being shameless in ‘how they go around the 
world perpetuating this idea of Africa being poor and pathetic’ (quoted in Brand Africa 2010: 10). 
10 
It is therefore somewhat ironic that the solution identified in order to recapture agency for 
Africa’s future also entails drawing on ‘Western’ knowledge with respect to branding and 
marketing as the best way to succeed in a globalised economy. As Mathias Akotia (2010), the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Brand Ghana Office notes, while ‘[b]randing is part of the reason there is 
such an ever increasing gap between the developing and the developed countries’, by adopting a 
professional branding programme itself Ghana might be able to close this gap. In line with the 
claims of Western branding consultants, it is argued that developing a strong nation brand will 
entice foreign investment, improve national self-esteem and, in doing so, even ‘enhance citizenship 
behaviours’. In other words, by fostering a stronger sense of national identity and social solidarity, 
and emphasising citizens’ responsibilities as national brand carriers, it is claimed, branding may 
also reduce ‘crime and violence, corruption, unstable political environment, poor safety and 
security, poor labour productivity, poor public health and sanitation’ (Akotia 2010). The potential 
power attributed to branding here is therefore significant, with branding depicted as a relatively 
uncomplicated panacea for a range of economic and social problems, and a panacea that will help 
nations leap up the development league tables, however, also a panacea once more premised on 
exporting Western ‘knowledge’ and governance norms.  
Such claims, of course, also raise questions as to what a successful campaign of nation 
branding is seen to entail. It is important to note that, in this respect, significantly different 
perceptions exist amongst both branding consultants and policymakers. Some, for example, believe 
that nation branding is fundamentally about narrative and suggest that attractive and aspirational 
branding stories about the nation might be enough to produce concrete and material effects. 
Therefore, like Akotia above, Ikalafeng suggests that people are liable to grow into the national 
image projected: ‘say “incredible India” long enough and soon the Indians see themselves as 
incredible and behave accordingly’ (quoted in Versi 2012: 100). This view is notably at odds with 
orthodox views on development insofar as it privileges perception in attracting investment over the 
implementation of the various reforms central to the (post)-Washington Consensus agenda. Others, 
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however, argue that branding can only work on the back of fundamental economic, social and 
political changes; therefore, branding is something that follows and reinforces other developments. 
Thus, positive brands will only emerge if corruption is tackled, good governance established and 
new exciting products for the marketplace created. Most notable here is Anholt (2007: 74), who 
argues that, to be successful, nation branding requires integrating the branding story into the 
development of public policy across the full range of political, social and economic activities. Thus, 
if a nation is troubled by poverty, corruption and insecurity, branding it as transparent, open, secure, 
and technologically advanced is unlikely to work unless fundamental changes are being introduced 
to bring this about. From this perspective, branding is best understood as a longer-term venture 
rather than a quick fix (Fan 2006: 11), and one where limited claims may be more credible.4 
As highlighted below, such ambiguities surrounding the nature of nation branding ultimately 
work to the benefit of branding consultants while simultaneously raising questions about the 
relevance of branding to development in the first place. However, the key point here is that the view 
of policymakers and governments frequently corresponds directly with the view of the respective 
branding consultants hired to help them develop their nation-branding strategy. In this respect, 
reading nation-branding strategies and the speeches and statements of policymakers on the issue (in 
both the developing and the developed world) is often little more than to read a paraphrased version 
of the marketing spiel of the consultants hired. To give just one example, nation-branding 
consultant Simon Anholt is known especially for his ‘hexagonal model’ of nation branding, in 
which national brand strength is assessed within the areas of brands (i.e. products), policy, culture, 
people, tourism and investment, his argument being that successful brands need to elicit 
considerable consistency across these six areas (Anholt: 2009a: 208–209). This notion of the 
hexagon not only comes to inform the considerations of policymakers, but is often repeated by them 
almost verbatim. To cite Arthur Mutambara, Zimbabwe’s Deputy Prime Minister, it is important to 
get the ‘hexagon of branding’ right, ‘[y]ou must be known well in those six areas of branding, and 
they must interact and feed into one another’ (quoted in Brand Africa 2011: 15). As noted below, 
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this emphasis on consistency is also open to question. The central point, however, is to emphasise 
how in the developing world (and elsewhere) the claims of branding consultants are being 
increasingly accepted as gospel.5 The result is that underdevelopment is frequently reconstituted as 
a problem of image control and the failure to assert control over national brands. 
To give a better sense of the nature of nation-branding campaigns, it is useful to look at the 
case of South Africa, which, prior to the end of apartheid in 1994, suffered from an extremely poor 
international image and has subsequently actively sought to revamp its reputation through 
systematic processes of nation branding. In this respect, alongside the more usual goals of attracting 
tourism and investment and helping the nation realise its international relations objectives, nation 
branding has also been understood as central to processes of nation-building in the post-apartheid 
era. Over time, the brand has developed from Nelson Mandela’s initial emphasis on South Africa as 
an inclusive ‘rainbow nation’ embracing diversity (instead of the previous emphasis on 
discrimination) (Rose 2010: 255) to more recent articulations – not least linked to South Africa’s 
hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup – of the country leading an African renaissance (Alegi 2008: 
399). Central objectives, however, have been to present South Africa as a normal and democratising 
country, a willing and trustworthy partner, and a vibrant, young nation with a rich cultural and 
historical heritage. Moreover, given its post-apartheid transition, another goal has also been to 
establish a political brand as a mediator in seemingly intractable political conflicts, with the country 
offering its services in places like Northern Ireland, Israel, East Timor and various African countries 
(Youde 2009: 129, 134–35). 
However, particularly important in systematising the branding process was the establishment 
of the International Marketing Council of South Africa (IMC) in 2000 to act as the custodian of 
‘Brand South Africa’ by working with key stakeholders (government, citizens, organised labour, 
business, NGOs, educational institutions, the media) in crafting, coordinating and promoting a 
coherent brand (Youde 2009: 128; International Marketing Council of South Africa 2010/2011: 5). 
Key mechanisms for doing this have included targeted advertising campaigns at key international 
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events like the World Economic Forum, the production of documentaries explaining South Africa’s 
potential as a political and business partner for foreigners, the development of a Brand South Africa 
Marketer’s Portal, which provides key stakeholders with information, tools and material to help 
them promote the country via the consistent application of the brand and, last but not least, through 
the marketing of South Africa as an attractive destination for major international events. Since 
1994, this has seen the country host the Rugby World Cup, the African Nations Cup, the 17th United 
Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention of the Parties, and the 2010 World Cup 
(International Marketing Council of South Africa 2010/2011: 6; Alegi 2008: 399). Indeed, South 
Africa’s successful bid to host the World Cup was seen as a unique opportunity to enhance the 
prestige, credibility and leadership image of the country, while simultaneously helping to dispel 
‘perceptions about Africa as the lost continent’ (International Marketing Council of South Africa 
2009/2010: 10). Aside from the opportunities afforded for the active international promotion of 
South Africa, the IMC also coordinated an extensive programme designed to enhance pride and 
patriotism amongst South Africans and to mobilise them behind the event. 
As with all such branding projects, assessing the actual impact of these efforts has been 
difficult and it easily supports mixed conclusions. On the one hand, events like the World Cup do 
seem to have enhanced patriotism and solidarity over the short term (International Marketing 
Council of South Africa 2009/2010: 16). However, the country’s performance in branding league 
tables has been less impressive. Thus, while South Africa has been seen as having the leading 
nation brand in Africa, between 2009 and 2010 its position in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands 
Index actually dropped from 25th to 37th, a position it has more or less maintained since. All this 
raises questions about the actual benefit of hosting the World Cup and about the ability of nation-
branding campaigns to fulfil their promise (International Marketing Council of South Africa 
2010/2011: 24).6 
 
Critical engagement: A sheep in wolf’s clothing?  
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It may, of course, be that some of the claims made concerning the relationship between nation 
branding and development are sound. For example, it is hard to deny that images (positive or 
negative) are important when foreign individuals, companies and governments come to make 
decisions regarding potential foreign investments. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
enhancing a nation’s image and brand will also improve that nation’s chances to benefit from 
foreign investment, or that it might have a potentially positive impact on tourism and the country’s 
sense of national identity and solidarity. However, such a straightforward understanding of the 
relationship between nation branding and development – as perpetuated by the industry – also 
warrants critical examination insofar as it entails particular and contentious understandings of the 
primary causes of underdevelopment, while the solution offered, that of enhanced nation branding, 
also raises questions concerning what development is understood to be and what it is supposed to 
entail in the first place. 
The first point to note is that an emphasis on nation branding, arguably, implies an inherently 
conservative and status quo understanding of problems of underdevelopment. In other words, 
emphasising nation branding as a development strategy essentially entails upholding and promoting 
capitalist notions of neoliberal market economics. Thus, instead of viewing what Jansen (2008: 131) 
terms ‘market fundamentalism’ as a structural problem and potential cause of global inequalities 
and underdevelopment, as many post-colonial scholars, dependency theorists and neo-Marxists 
would be prone to do, for nation-branding advocates the market remains inherently benign, their 
goal being to utilise the apparently ‘neutral’ tools of nation branding to rebalance global economic 
inequalities (Youde 2009: 132). In other words, inequality and underdevelopment are not a problem 
of global economic structures – such as the impact of developed world agricultural subsidies on 
Africa’s ability to compete or the renewed emphasis on Africa as a source of raw materials rather 
than manufacturing – or of local/national/regional problems of insecurity and corruption, but rather 
of images and weak national brands. Contrary to van Ham (2002: 263), then, who suggests that an 
emphasis on branding entails an essentially ‘pragmatic and ideologically undogmatic’ way of 
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thinking, branding actually entails a fundamentally ideological view of the world, however, one 
obscured by the depoliticising invocation that matters of identity and development are best left in 
the hands of branding consultants with the requisite technical expertise (Kapoor 2013: 3).7 
This ideological view can be teased out with reference to Foucault’s account of how, over the 
course of the twentieth century, the idea of states directing and monitoring the economy was 
superseded by neoliberalism’s emphasis on the market as the ‘organizing and regulative principle 
underlying the state’ (Lemke 2001: 200; Foucault 2008). This depoliticisation and naturalisation of 
the market, in turn, fostered a view in which subjects became seen as entrepreneurs and sources of 
capital with responsibility for enhancing their own wealth (Lemke 2001: 199; Foucault 2008). 
While at one level the emphasis on entrepreneurship can be empowering, as evident in the 
invocation of consultants that nations take control of their brand, it also operates as a form of (self)-
regulation and domination by suggesting that one of the reasons why poor countries may be poor is 
because they have failed to tap effectively into their entrepreneurial capacities (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2009: 5; Lemke 2001: 201). Therefore, responsibility for development shifts from the 
system to the subject, a view expressed succinctly in Mathias Akotia’s (2010) lamentation of the 
lack of entrepreneurial initiative in his assertion that ‘[w]e [Ghana/Africa] continue to miss 
opportunities and blame others for our unfortunate situation’. Therefore, in this scheme, while 
strategies of nation branding may enhance the sense of national empowerment and self-esteem, they 
remain premised on a process in which success, or failure, is located firmly at the level of the 
actions and conduct of governments and their citizens. 
Secondly, the claim that nation branding can provide a more general solution to problems of 
underdevelopment is fundamentally problematic and disingenuous in its own terms. The carrot of 
branding consultants is that, by adopting persuasive branding strategies, developing nations will be 
able to lift themselves out of poverty. This, however, is at odds with the nation-branding narrative 
that depicts states in fierce competition for a slice of the relatively fixed investment/tourism/status 
pie. For example, Brand South Africa’s positioning of the country as a ‘gateway’ into Africa and a 
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leader, ‘conduit’, ‘springboard’ and ‘catalyst’ of African growth in general is premised on an 
explicit understanding of the need for a competitive edge, which, in this respect, is signalled 
through the implicit message that the country stands apart by being more advanced, stable and 
predictable than its African partners/competitors (International Marketing Council of South Africa 
2009/2010: 4; 2010/2011: 5). Therefore, at best, the implication would seem to be that, while 
branding might work for some, not all nations will be so fortunate in what is essentially presented 
as a zero-sum game of winners and losers (Mayes 2008: 130–31). 
Indeed, more generally, little consideration is given to the question of who is likely to benefit 
even from those nation-branding programmes that are deemed successful. Given the emphasis on 
economic competition, it is unclear whether or not the fruits of economic growth will actually 
trickle down to the poorest in society, thereby enhancing social justice as opposed to benefitting 
corporations and an already affluent elite (Gertner 2007: 5). For instance, while the 2010 South 
African World Cup brought considerable economic benefits to big business and major construction 
firms contracted to deliver new stadia and infrastructure, the escalating liabilities were to be carried 
by a public purse already stretched in tackling problems of widespread poverty, high 
unemployment, lack of housing, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. As Alegi (2008: 400–408, 414) 
notes, many of these projects replicated the existing facilities, were located in picturesque locations 
rather than in places where they might have optimum impact on urban regeneration, and were often 
built in spite of local opposition, with smaller enterprises and ordinary taxpayers squeezed out of 
lucrative contracts. In conclusion, Alegi suggests that, for the majority of South Africans, the World 
Cup preparations enhanced neither their political nor economic situation (which was emphasised 
during the event by what was for many the unaffordable cost of tickets). Instead, the emphasis 
rather seemed to be on encouraging people to exercise a form of ‘cultural citizenship’ (Alegi 2008: 
415), not least evident in the IMC’s ‘Fly the Flag’ and ‘Football Fridays’ campaigns – the latter 
being days when citizens were encouraged to wear the Bafana Bafana national team jersey 
(International Marketing Council of South Africa 2010/2011: 28–29). 
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The third issue is that, to the extent to which nation branding naturalises a market-based 
approach to development, it also reinforces the neoliberal tendency to view development in terms of 
the monetised consumption of material goods and the relative ranking of a state’s GDP. This 
reflects a very limited way of measuring poverty and development because it generally fails to take 
account of the range of economic transactions that take place outside of capitalist markets (Escobar 
1995: 21–54; Thomas 2005). More notably, it also entails reducing conceptions of development and 
wealth to how well nation branding might promote inward investment, external knowledge of a 
country, or national solidarity (with the latter two generally subordinated to their role of promoting 
the former). As Aronczyk (2008: 56) notes, other forms of wealth or development, which might be 
understood in terms of promoting ‘self-realization, noninstrumental forms of community, mutual 
respect’, are excluded here. 
The fourth point, therefore, is that nation branding seems to, again, fall foul of Escobar’s 
(1995: 26) orientalist accusation that, in most development discourses, Western knowledge, 
expectations and practices concerning the ‘normal’ course of development and progress are 
privileged over others. An example is provided by Oliver Schmitz, the managing director for South 
Africa at the Brand Finance consultancy, who asserts that, to develop, ‘Africa as a whole needs to 
understand the importance of brand value and the need to track that value’ (quoted in Pienaar 2011). 
Although Schmitz is talking primarily about branded products, the basic point is that, apparently, 
Africans need educating to become more brand-savvy and to understand the value of measuring 
African brands against each other and against non-African brands. From an Escobarian perspective, 
the problem with this is that, ultimately, such advice seeks to transform local societies into 
consumerist societies, which think in branded terms and in which development is measured, at least 
in part, in terms of brand performance. 
The fifth point, perhaps even more fundamental, is that nation branding ultimately, in this 
respect, has the effect of valuing identity and culture only if they can be deployed in the service of 
turning a profit. Branding consultants, for example, typically depict national identity and culture as 
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‘fixed assets’ (e.g. Anholt 2008: 34) to be deployed in gaining economic and status benefits. Gary 
Harwood of the marketing services company HKLM thus suggests that ‘national branding […] is no 
different from any other kind of branding’ (quoted in Markessinis 2009: n.p.). Such a view reduces 
identity and culture to products or forms of intellectual property (Jansen 2008: 121). This, for 
example, is clearly the view of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, which, in a 2006 
publication, emphasised that ‘every country has a culture, a heritage, resources, natural beauty, and 
internal qualities that can be identified and defined, highlighted and captured, in a nation-branding 
initiative which is both pleasing and economically effective’ (quoted in Aronczyk 2008: 45). The 
danger of commoditising culture and identity in this way is that it subordinates social life to the 
market (Block 2001: xxiv). In turn, this narrows the bases upon which national self-esteem and 
social solidarity can be constituted. Under such logics, identities, cultures, histories and places are 
no longer presented ‘as foci of attachment and concern, but as bundles of social and economic 
opportunity competing against one another in the open (and unregulated) market for a share of the 
capital investment cake (whether this be the investment of enterprises, tourists, local consumers or 
whatever)’ (Philo and Kearns 1993: 18, original emphasis).8 
Moreover, this process of commoditising culture and identity and valuing them in terms of 
their marketability has another important consequence. Namely, national values shift from being 
understood as intrinsic goods to being valued insofar as they help the country sell itself, whether 
politically or economically (Angell and Mordhorst 2012). Ultimately, this shifts the focus from 
internal negotiations, concerning what different domestic constituencies think about the intrinsic or 
authentic nature of the national self, to attempts to anticipate the broader desires of outsiders and of 
the market in general. For example, in its push to develop a national brand, the Royal Government 
of Bhutan (2010: 6) has emphasised the need to tone down ‘the brightness of our textiles’ with the 
more ‘sober colours that the affluent Western markets prefer’. In other words, national identity and 
culture need to be moulded and packaged with the preferences and tastes of outsiders in mind. In a 
similar vein, a core mantra of nation branding becomes that of emphasising how different nations 
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can make themselves relevant and useful to the rest of the international community and to the lives 
of people around the globe, the view being that such ‘altruism’ will have a self-interested pay-off in 
terms of international prestige (K 2011; Anholt 2009b: 94; Henrikson 2005). South Africa’s attempt 
to position itself as a peace mediator is one example, but many other branding campaigns make 
similar claims (e.g. Finland, Norway, Colombia). Therefore, as Philo and Kearns (1993: 20–21) 
note, place/nation branding tends to result in everyone packaging themselves in more or less the 
same ways, deploying similar sets of aspirational motifs, and in general avoiding anything 
controversial. To quote the consultant Harwood again, ‘[n]ational brands should assist in building a 
holistic, non-political reputation of a country over an extended period of time’ (quoted in 
Markessinis 2009: n.p.). The emphasis is on being neutral and non-offensive – to global 
capital/international sentiment – since that is perceived as best for reputation and business. A good 
example is provided by Euh Yoon-dae, chairman of South Korea’s nation-branding council, who 
suggests that helping Koreans ‘become more acceptable to other cultures’ should be central to 
South Korea’s branding programme (quoted in Jeong-ju 2009: n.p.). 
Thus, interestingly, whereas nation branding in principle entails identifying niche markets (in 
terms of products, services and identity), through which the nation becomes relevant and useful to 
others, in practice it ultimately undermines global diversity, since emulating the desires of others 
and making sure one does not fall out of fashion is central to success in a branding world.9 At best, 
therefore, to the extent to which nation-branding processes promote diversity (see Freire 2005) 
Jansen (2008: 133) suggests it is in the form of ‘global cultural stereotyping’. As she notes, Anholt 
recommends creating ‘boutique nations’ proposing, for example, that Estonia develop a niche 
market for hockey sticks. In a similar vein, the singer Bono (2009) has suggested that, owing to its 
exciting music scene and ‘the conversation of Kofi’, Ghana might do well to market itself as the 
‘birthplace of cool’. Such stereotyping not only reconfigures nations as vendors in a global 
department store but, as evident in the Ghana example, it also has the potential to reproduce rather 
typical orientalist discourses in which the developing world becomes the exoticised target of the 
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desires of Western consumers (Jansen 2008: 133). This is nowhere more evident than in the 
branding associated with the tourist trade, in which attempts to appeal to the desire of visitors to 
consume local otherness easily result in the reproduction and enactment of legible forms of 
primordialism and exoticism that draw heavily on colonial imagery and are often implicitly racist 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009: 94, 142). The ironies here are obvious. Insofar as the critique of 
traditional forms of development aid, as presented by the nation-branding industry, is that it results 
in negative stereotyping of poor regions, the solution offered entails the clear danger of simply 
replacing these with other (often well-established) stereotypes (Widler 2007: 148). 
Finally, it is also important to note that national branding generally entails significant 
disciplining elements that raise questions concerning what a nation-branding approach to 
development means for the promotion of democracy. Two issues stand out. The first is that, despite 
proclamations that nation branding can have positive social effects by promoting national solidarity 
through providing an aspirational story of the nation, which can enhance the overall sense of 
national pride, it is important to remember that such processes are not neutral. The reason is that 
central to nation-branding strategies is the aim of establishing social consensus around certain 
(usually bourgeois and corporate – Philo and Kearns 1993: 25-6) ideological commitments and 
around particular mandated national narratives to the exclusion of others. The second issue is that, 
while nation branders often assert that establishing ‘good governance’ is central to creating positive 
brands, it is important to consider what exactly is meant by good governance in a branding context. 
With the two issues combined, the central criticism is that nation branding entails inherently 
hierarchical and exclusionary modes of governance, which are at odds with clearly open democratic 
debate. Nation-branding consultants, for instance, keenly assert that successful nation branding 
requires the sublimation of conflicting messages and the establishment of a consistent and unified 
national story (Anholt 2007: 74–75). As Dambisa Moyo (quoted in Brand Africa 2010: 18) puts it, 
part of Africa’s problem is that ‘[t]here isn’t a strong credible consistent message about this 
continent’. As such, the suggestion is that strong national brands require the establishment of 
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consensus around an agreed-upon national story and identity. Hence, it is instructive to note that 
consultants often see their role as helping to distil (and market) the fundamental essence or truth of 
the nation (Aronczyk 2008: 52) from the broader diversity of contending national identity 
narratives. Of course, the process followed to identify such an essence can assume various levels of 
openness. Typical, for example, is the establishment of a national branding committee comprised of 
a selection of government officials, civil servants, industry leaders, cultural figures, academics and 
sports stars. Indeed, sometimes, these committees may engage in extensive consultations with the 
broader population to try and garner as many views as possible. However, evidently, rather than 
uncovering national essences and truths, branding commissions and consultants are engaged 
fundamentally in constituting them, not least through presupposing the existence of an 
unproblematic link between group identity and a particular place (Mayes 2008: 125). Yet, once a 
story and identity have been agreed upon, national identity is solidified around certain 
inclusionary/exclusionary components. For example, the re-envisioning of South Africa as a 
‘rainbow nation’ embracing multiculturalism and market economy has inevitably reduced the 
permitted ideological diversity in the nation and it raises the question of what citizens should do if 
they do not identify with the values espoused by the national brand (Marsh and Fawcett 2011: 517; 
Widler 2007: 149). 
In this respect, various commentators have suggested that nation branding is easily amenable 
to a Foucauldian analysis of governmentality (e.g. Sending and Neumann 2006), in which states are 
increasingly understood as enforcing social order, not so much through violence and coercion, but 
primarily through pushing citizens morally into conformity (van Ham 2002: 267; Weidner 2011). 
Put slightly differently, the success of nation-branding strategies is often understood as dependent 
upon ‘getting everybody in the country to speak with one voice’ (Anholt 2007: 80) and, in the 
words of the IMC CEO, Miller Matola (2012: n.p.), to ‘live the brand’.10 As noted by Zimbabwe’s 
Deputy Prime Minister, Arthur Mutambara, citizens must come to assume the role of ‘brand 
ambassadors’ (cited in Brand Africa 2011: 15; see also Aronczyk 2008: 54). Likewise, Mathias 
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Akotia of the Brand Ghana Office not only understands national brands as representations of the 
‘true self’, and therefore ‘resistant to change’, but also argues that the brand’s/identity’s values need 
‘internalisation […] through conscious citizenship programmes’, which will promote ‘the 
appropriate citizenship behaviour’. In short, ‘all stakeholders [citizens, business, government, 
academia, political parties] should be united by the nation’s brand vision and shared values to work 
together and align their behaviour to a common national strategy’ (Akotia 2010). Citizens who fail 
to do this and act ‘off brand’ are, as such, moving into the realms of unpatriotic behaviour and 
subject to being criticised for putting the success of the branding strategy in question. Thus, Miller 
Matola (2012: n.p.) emphasises that South Africans ‘need to unite with one strong voice, committed 
to thinking, acting and speaking positively about the many things that South Africa is getting right, 
instead of constantly focusing on the negative and stimulating global negative sentiment’. Despite 
protestations otherwise, such disciplining elements therefore indicate that, in a nation-branding 
context, good governance is less concerned with the promotion of a vibrant participatory democracy 
and is more a synonym for the creation of order and a stable and secure environment for capital 
investments. As van Ham (2002: 267) and Jansen (2008: 135) both note, the fact that Singapore is 
often championed as a successful example of nation branding, owing to the cohesion and 
consistency of its national message, should provide pause for thought in this respect. 
 
Development aid, branding and the ‘good state’ 
In examining the relationship between branding and development, the article has, so far, critically 
explored the argument of nation-branding consultants that nation branding, not aid, provides the 
best opportunity for the world’s poor states to develop. According to this argument, development 
aid is not only ineffective, but may actually be counterproductive insofar as it reproduces negative 
stereotypes of the developing world, which may dissuade global capital from making investments 
while simultaneously serving to disenfranchise developing states from playing a significant 
international political role. From this perspective, aid is the problem, branding the solution. 
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However, dichotomising aid and branding in this way is problematic because possessing an 
international aid policy often plays a fundamental role in nation-branding strategies of both 
developed world states as well as those ‘transition’ states seeking recognition of such a status. 
Highlighting this point is important as it further crystallises some of the problems and 
contradictions entailed in viewing nation branding as central to solving problems of global 
inequality. 
Of course, states may develop overseas development aid programmes for various reasons. For 
example, they may be motivated by purely humanitarian concerns, the goal being a genuine desire 
to assist the world’s poorest escape poverty. For instance, the UK’s Department for International 
Development (2012) justifies the fact that India remains the biggest recipient of British 
development aid – despite having one of the world’s fastest growing economies, 153,000 dollar 
millionaires, nuclear weapons and a space programme – on the grounds that one third of the world’s 
poor (people living on less than $1.25 a day) live in the country (Bidwai 2012). However, it is also 
clear that states often use overseas development aid to promote economic interests. Thus, for some, 
Britain’s generosity was tainted in 2011 when the Development Secretary suggested that the 
continued granting of high levels of aid was partly designed to help the UK win a bid to provide 
India with Typhoon fighter jets (Bidwai 2012). And, of course, in this case, it may also be that 
British development aid is also motivated by considerations of guilt over the colonial legacy, or the 
desire to retain strategic influence following decolonisation. 
However, such ethical, economic, political and historical motivations are also often tied up 
with concerns over national image, status and prestige. For this reason, overseas development aid 
policies are often co-opted in debates over nation branding and an important hierarchy is re-
inscribed in the relationship between donors and recipients. South Korea provides a good example. 
In seeking to explain why the country is still regarded as poor in many parts of the world, the 
leaders of the branding programme concluded that it was partly because the country ‘had failed to 
provide sufficient contribution to the international community and has not been active in helping 
24 
poor countries’ (Euh Yoon-dae quoted in Jeong-ju 2009). To rectify this – and closely reminiscent 
of South Africa’s emphasis on providing good services through international peace-mediation 
efforts – it was decided that overseas development aid and the number of volunteers should be 
increased. As suggested by Euh Yoon-dae, chairman of South Korea’s branding council, ‘[t]hat will 
contribute greatly to improving Korea’s brand power’ (quoted in Myo-ja 2009: n.p.). 
It is important to be clear as to what the messages here are. The most obvious message is that 
possessing a development aid (or conflict resolution) programme is symbolic of success and a 
potential passport to the higher echelons of the international community – a source of status and 
prestige (e.g. Kapoor 2013: 26, 64–65). In contrast, being a recipient is perceived negatively. India 
provides another good example of this juxtaposition since it has recently discussed rejecting British 
development aid in view of the perceived negative publicity it affords (Gilligan 2012), while in 
2011 it also created its own aid agency. As noted by Rajiv Sharma, Secretary General of the 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce, ‘[t]he creation of an aid agency is a recognition by 
the Indian establishment that India has arrived as a global player with strategic interests’ (quoted in 
Patel 2011). 
While, no doubt, this is true, there are three concerns worth noting when development aid is 
tied to nation branding in this way. Firstly, insofar as successfully branding a nation as developed is 
perceived as dependent upon being an active giver of overseas development aid, such nation-
branding strategies are actually premised on the preservation of structural inequalities between 
donor and recipient nations. In other words, the creation of a positive image of a generous aid donor 
requires the presence of aid recipients in order to make that self-image meaningful. 
Secondly, on the face of it, the giving of development aid as a central characteristic of what it 
means to be a developed state may appear inherently progressive. However, there is an unsettling 
ethical dilemma underlying this premise. The dilemma is that if, in a branding world, national 
prestige and status are gained by out-competing others in securing investment, tourism, attracting 
foreign professionals etc., the attendant sense of self-esteem is to be gained at the economic cost of 
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others, and even, potentially, through feeling superior to them. In other words, in the all-against-all 
competition for investment, prestige and attention peddled by nation-branding consultants, 
successful nation branding is understood as gaining more of the pie for oneself. Co-opting 
development aid into such strategies thus shifts the rationale from a focus on redistribution to 
viewing such disbursements as part of a longer-term strategy for the nation’s enhanced 
accumulation of capital, attention, prestige and power to the detriment of others. 
Finally, as highlighted by the South Korea example, insofar as providing development aid is 
premised on enhancing one’s own national brand standing, it also entails an inversion in which, in a 
branding world, humanitarian action is driven less by an ethical concern for others and more by the 
desire to preserve a particular national image that solidifies the brand. It may also feed further into 
the already evident practices, whereby aid is not given simply to those in greatest need, but is given 
in light of other considerations. Thus, along with the directing of aid in support of economic (the 
UK–India example) or security (see Duffield 2001) concerns, we might see aid directed 
increasingly towards where it is deemed liable to produce the greatest brand enhancement effect. 
Overall, therefore, industry attempts to neutralise the image of nation branding, and even to 
provide it with a positive spin as a potential tool for advancing global justice by eradicating global 
inequalities, appear disingenuous. Such claims rely on juxtaposing a nation-branding approach to 
development with one premised on aid, but remain silent about how branding and aid are closely 
intertwined in many contexts, not least through attempts by donor countries to construct images of 
themselves as caring good states. However, such positive images remain premised on reproducing 
structural inequalities and hierarchies. Thus, while at first glance nation branding may appear to 
offer a radical alternative to aid, in practice the two are often operating as part of the same game. 
 
Conclusion: Beware of prophets bearing gifts 
The overall message of this article is that the claims of nation-branding consultants should be 
treated circumspectly. Although at an intuitive level the argument that negative images of Africa 
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reproduced in the global media and by aid agencies may undermine the continent’s possibilities for 
development makes sense, it is unclear that the solution to this problem lies simply in bringing 
branding strategies to work on the side of the developing world. As argued, an emphasis on nation 
branding has the effect of restricting any diagnosis of the causes of underdevelopment. As an 
approach operating within the ideological framework of neoliberalism, it suggests that 
underdevelopment is a problem of failing to use the tools appropriate for succeeding in global 
deregulated markets. The idea that this system and ideology might themselves be fundamental 
causes of underdevelopment is discounted from the offset. Similarly, the article has also suggested 
that nation branding is problematic due to its commodification of identity and culture and because 
the assumed need for coherent unified national brands also entails unsettling implications for our 
understanding of good governance – insofar as successful branding appears to favour hierarchical 
rather than democratic decision-making and entails notable disciplining elements. Finally, the 
article has also argued that the juxtaposition of branding with aid is plagued by internal 
contradictions of both a practical and ethical nature. 
In conclusion, however, we might also suggest that none of this is particularly surprising. 
After all, branding consultants are, almost by definition, fully signed-up supporters of neoliberal 
markets. Any industry analysis of the relationship between nation branding and development is, 
therefore, unlikely to be particularly radical. This, however, should make us increasingly wary of 
the wares sold by nation-branding consultants and of the arguments they deploy to generate 
business. The article, therefore, ends with a health warning about the marketing rhetoric of branding 
consultants. 
The key point to remember is that ‘[b]randing experts and marketing gurus may have a vested 
interest in telling peripheral and unbranded countries how hopelessly obsolete they appear without a 
state brand of their own’ (Metahaven 2008: 6). As Simon Anholt (2010: 14) suggests, in the 
globalised market place of everyone competing with everyone else, reputation, image, standing and 
brand become everything. This claim, however, can be contested in several respects. First, as Fan 
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(2006: 9) notes, it is important to distinguish between nation brands and product brands. The point 
is that having a poor or weak national brand does not necessarily translate into poor sales of 
national products. For instance, a Chinese consumer might still prefer Japanese cameras despite 
having a generally unfavourable perception of the country. The opposite is also possible. This issue 
is important as it raises questions about causation. The claim of nation-branding consultants is that 
national economic development is significantly dependent upon generating a positive national 
brand, yet, as Fan (2006: 9) notes, this causal link is far from established, while others note that 
‘hyped’ claims of branding consultants have often been contested (Jansen 2008: 130). In this 
respect, the evidence marshalled by nation-branding consultants is often circumstantial or, at best, 
premised on establishing correlations. For example, in a publication connected to the Brand Africa 
initiative, Tom Sitati, Executive Director of Interbrand Sampson East Africa, points to the 
correlation that seven of the top ten countries in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nations Brand Index are 
also in the global top ten in terms of GDP. The unanswered question, however, is whether or not 
this GDP performance is in any way related to the countries having adopted nation-branding 
strategies (Sitati 2010: 7). 
Similarly, as we have seen, nation-branding consultants are also often unclear about what 
nation branding entails, frequently suggesting that rebranding a nation requires fundamental 
economic, social and political changes liable to take decades. Again, while this may be true, it also 
entails an interesting get-out clause for consultants whose own engagement in such projects is 
usually limited to months (Aronczyk 2008: 32). Consultants can thus avoid responsibility for any 
failure on their part, with a typical industry refrain being that branding projects generally fail 
because of a lack of client commitment to follow through sufficiently (da Silva 2010; Teslik 2007; 
Olins 2005: 178). The flip side, of course, is that such fundamental societal reorientations are 
usually driven by considerations of social justice, and rarely by considerations of brand image. 
Thus, the industry’s touting of the transformation of Spain’s image after Franco as an instance of 
successful rebranding is disingenuous (Fan 2006: 11). From this perspective, nation branding is 
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much more likely to follow social, political and economic transformations, as opposed to leading 
them. If this is correct, then the role of nation-branding consultants is much less essential than they 
would claim and, perhaps, reduced to providing a presentational flourish. 
Likewise, industry claims that national brands should be coherent are also questionable, but 
fundamental, since distilling coherent and consistent brands for customers is, ultimately, the essence 
of the nation-branding business model. Indeed, it is the wrap around notion of the concept that is 
seen to distinguish nation branding from simple marketing/advertising. The assumption is that 
nuance breeds mixed messages and confusion in the minds of the global audience. Governments, 
foreign ministries, tourist boards, investment-promotion agencies, companies and citizens, we are 
told, need to be singing from the same hymn sheet (Anholt 2007: 74, 79–80). One danger is that this 
treats the audience as undiscerning. Another is that, while an emphasis on a cohesive narrative 
across all sectors might help create an overall coherent country brand, this cohesion as such might 
not be particularly helpful to advancing the interests of specific national constituencies (Fan 2006: 
10). Indeed, it is certainly instructive that the attempts to create nation brands in terms of being 
innovative, environmental, technologically advanced, trustworthy, cultural etc. are highly generic 
and interchangeable. The irony, therefore, may well be that the emphasis consultants place on 
homogeneity and conformity is as problematic as it is helpful. 
Given the various critiques noted and, not least, given the difficulties of measuring the effects 
of nation-branding programmes accurately, the question that remains open is why states are 
increasingly employing such consultants to help them develop their own nation-branding strategies. 
It may be that governments are easily and willingly lured into believing that nation branding may 
provide the kind of boost promised. The suggestion of this article, however, is that, tied in with 
broader understandings of the inevitabilities of globalisation and neoliberal economics, nation 
branding has emerged as an increasingly self-reinforcing discourse that further normalises and 
advances ‘market fundamentalism’ (Jansen 2008: 131). Thus, while not everyone is likely to 
believe the hype that adopting a nation-branding strategy will solve a state’s various economic and 
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social problems and lead a nation (indeed a continent) out of poverty, the fear will always be that if 
we do not, at least, play the game when all our competitors are, we will surely lose. Thus, while in 
the context of development issues nation-branding consultants depict themselves as offering hope 
and salvation, one of their wares is also, surely, that of peddling fear. 
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Notes 
1 Most notable here is Simon Anholt, often described as a ‘guru’ of the nation-branding industry, 
in part because of his claim to have coined the very concept in 1996 (Aronczyk 2008: 47, Anholt 
2009a: 206). He has advised over 40 countries on matters of national identity, reputation and 
public diplomacy, he has established the journal of Place Branding and Public Diplomacy to 
debate the topic, and he is one of the most prolific and influential writers and speakers on the 
subject (Kaneva 2011: 117). For these reasons, particular attention is given to his work in this 
article. 
2 Although there are links between nation branding and public diplomacy, the terms refer to 
different practices. Traditionally understood, public diplomacy concerns attempts by foreign 
ministries to present and sell government policies to foreign publics (Potter 2002: 3; Mor 2011; 
Anholt 2008: 41). In contrast, nation branding entails mobilising a much broader range of 
governmental and social actors in order to project a nation’s identity both at home and abroad 
(Melissen 2005: 19–21). Indeed, as argued below, nation branding is not simply about projecting 
national identity, but rather, fundamentally, about constructing it in the first place. 
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3 One result, as Cameron and Haanstra (2008) note, is a growing shift to try and re-motivate 
people by presenting development and aid as sexy. For criticisms of celebrity 
diplomacy/humanitarianism as not only oversimplifying problems of development, but also as 
both indicative of the rise of private authority in global governance and re-legitimising the very 
economic system and relations of production that, arguably, lie at the heart of many development 
problems, see Kapoor (2013), Cooper (2008) and Dieter and Kumar (2008). 
4 In Avraham and Ketter‘s (2013: 146, 160–61) terms, the difference here is that between 
‘cosmetic’ and ‘strategic’ approaches to nation branding. They invoke Nigeria’s attempt to 
rebrand itself in 2009 without tackling the fundamental problems of governmental corruption 
and internal tensions as an example of a cosmetic approach, which is viewed widely as having 
failed and even undermined Nigeria’s international image further. 
5 Indeed, this reliance on branding consultants is itself reflective of the more general trend towards 
outsourcing responsibility for governance to experts in the contemporary era of ‘advanced 
liberalism’ (Rose 1993; Larner 2002). 
6 The IMC suggests this is because South Africa is seen more as a tourist than an investment 
destination. In part, this is because South Africa is still perceived to face challenges in terms of 
governance, indicating that, in various respects, the alignment between the brand and reality 
seems awry (International Marketing Council of South Africa 2010/2011: 24). 
7 There is a parallel here with the ‘Brand aid’ movement exemplified by Bono’s Project RED, 
whereby iconic brands like Nike, Apple and Armani donate a percentage of sales from certain 
products to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS. Unlike fair trade schemes, which seek to reshape 
production and exchange relations, Project RED suggests that ‘consumers can save HIV/AIDS 
patients in Africa “simply” by shopping’. For corporations and consumers, Project RED offers a 
win-win situation. Corporations that sign up to the scheme can enhance their brand’s ethical 
profile and boost sales, while consumers can continue consuming with their conscience sated by 
the message that they are partaking in a form of ‘just capitalism’  (Richey and Ponte 2012: 136–
31 
 
37). Such brand aid, however, does nothing to challenge the structures of production, distribution 
and ownership that create global inequalities, but rather positions the poverty and illness of 
Africa as a marketing opportunity for corporations (Cheru 2012: 139). Simultaneously, brand aid 
reaffirms established social hierarchies of beneficent Westerners helping impoverished Africans 
(Abrahamsen 2012: 140–41). 
8 For a slightly different take on the relationship between commodification and culture/identity, 
see Comaroff and Comaroff (2009), who suggest that, at least in the case of branding ethnicity, 
commodification can also lead to important processes of self-reflection and even cultural 
exploration and recovery. Moreover, if identity requires the recognition of others in order to be, 
then commodification does provide one route for securing such recognition. The flip side, 
however, is that commodification may also result in a fixed and essentialised, rather than 
dynamic, view of culture and identity (see below). 
9 For such a critique of the logic of consumerist cultures, see Veblen (1957). 
10 In Foucauldian terms, this is reflective of a ‘changing logic or rationality of government […] by 
which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon and into an 
entity that is both an object and a subject of government’ (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652). In 
other words, while branding processes seek to devolve responsibility onto citizens, in doing so 
citizens also become agents of governance. However, while citizens may be willing participants 
in this process, it is also important to recognise how ‘certain identities and action-orientations are 
defined as appropriate and normal’ in this process (Sending and Neumann 2006: 657). 
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